← PerspectivesKareem Soliman · 8 min read

The reading before the verdict

What drew me to psychology was a desire to understand people's reasons for doing things from their outward behaviour.

I find this endlessly fascinating. Someone does something we can see, and behind it is a world we cannot: what they noticed, what they feared, what they thought was possible, what an earlier experience taught them to expect. We meet the action at the end of that sequence. Often, we have very little access to the sequence itself.

Yet an explanation can arrive almost immediately. They wanted attention. They were avoiding responsibility. They did not care.

Perhaps. But it is remarkable how much of another person's interior life can apparently be established before they have finished speaking.

I am interested in that moment because it contains both the possibility of understanding and the possibility of getting someone badly wrong. The same appetite that draws me towards psychology can tempt me to finish the explanation too early. Having a theory available does not settle whether it belongs here.

What I have tried to cultivate is a combination of radical empathy and diligent theoretical study: learning about behaviour, cognition and emotion while trying to understand how a situation might look from inside someone else's circumstances. In the practice I am trying to build, each part needs the other. Empathy without a willingness to test an interpretation can become an elaborate act of imagining. Theory without empathy can become a very efficient way of giving people names.

I do not think the person should disappear behind either.


Imagine a colleague who says almost nothing in a meeting. This is an invented example. We can resist giving ourselves information nobody in the room would actually have.

Perhaps they have nothing to contribute. Perhaps they disagree and expect disagreement to be expensive. They might be concentrating, exhausted, unfamiliar with the subject, or waiting for someone else to finish. They might consider interrupting rude. We have observed a small amount of speech. We have not observed the reason.

A theoretical vocabulary expands what we can consider. That is valuable. But it also expands what we can say with confidence while remaining wrong.

The person who knows only one explanation may be trapped by it. The person who knows twenty has more opportunities to find a convincing one.

This is where empathy becomes interesting to me. I mean the effort to ask what would make an action intelligible from the actor's position. That effort does not require approving the action. An explanation of harm does not cancel its consequences. It does require leaving enough room for a reason other than the one most convenient to the observer.

Our quiet colleague might eventually say, “I was still thinking.”

It would be an awkward outcome for an interpretation with a bibliography.

The point of learning the theories is to improve the questions we can ask. Whether a particular theory explains this particular person remains something to find out. I can understand why an account is plausible and still have insufficient grounds to believe it.

That distinction has become central to what the word firāsa means to me.


Firāsa is an Arabic word associated with discernment: apprehending something inward through outward signs. Lane's lexicon records meanings ranging from perceptive insight and learned interpretation to religiously understood insight and physiognomy. There is more than one tradition gathered around the word. Lane's Arabic-English Lexicon.

The history matters, including the parts that resist a convenient story about my research. The physiognomic tradition included attempts to infer inward qualities from physical features; Antonella Ghersetti examines this history in her account of firāsa and intelligence. The existence of that tradition supplies no evidence that someone's character can be read reliably from their face. Ghersetti, 1996.

I would be doing something rather strange if I used a word about perceptiveness while looking away from the parts of its history that complicate my preferred interpretation.

What draws me to it is the aspiration to attend closely enough that the surface ceases to be the whole account. A behaviour becomes something to investigate. An apparent inconsistency becomes a question. What initially looked inexplicable may acquire structure when another part of the situation comes into view.

I have also encountered firāsa described as an insight that pounces upon a person. I like that image. It captures the speed with which recognition can happen, the feeling that several disconnected signs have suddenly become one intelligible thing.

I am using it here as an image, not as a claim that the word's entire history reduces to a pounce. Nor does the force of that feeling establish the accuracy of the insight.

Something can arrive with extraordinary conviction and still need checking. This is inconvenient. I would prefer my most compelling intuitions to arrive with their own independent audit.

Instead, I have had to train myself to suspend immediate judgement. To make room for the questions that are least welcome when an explanation feels satisfying: where could I be wrong? Under what conditions would what I have just said be false?

The questions do not make the insight disappear. They change what I am entitled to do with it.


There is a version of perceptiveness I could find very flattering: being someone who sees what others miss, who understands what is really happening.

There is also a considerable opportunity for projection hidden inside that description. The less direct access I have to another person's reasons, the more of my own explanatory work is involved in supplying them. An interpretation can tell me something about the person. It can also tell me which possibilities I was prepared to imagine.

That possibility needs to remain available even when the interpretation is compassionate.

Assuming someone acted from pain may be kinder than assuming they acted from malice. It is still an assumption. If I become attached to the benevolence of my explanation, I can make it difficult for the actual person to correct me. They are now disagreeing with an account of themselves that I have congratulated myself for understanding.

Radical empathy, as I want to practise it, has to include the possibility that my empathy has missed.

This changes the ambition. I still want to notice more. I still want to understand the relationship between what a person does and the conditions that made it reasonable, necessary or imaginable to them. But a good reading should remain open to the person it concerns.

The metaphor of reading helps only so far. A person is not a text with a correct interpretation waiting patiently inside it. People can tell us what we have missed. Their circumstances can change. They can be uncertain about their own reasons, as I can be about mine. There may be no final sentence that closes the account.

An action still has consequences. We still have to decide whom to trust, when to intervene, what boundaries to hold. Suspending an immediate verdict does not mean suspending every decision until another person's entire inner world becomes available.

I want the decision to reflect what I know, and to remain revisable where I do not know enough. Those are different demands, and sometimes they pull in different directions.


My fascination with research design grew from this desire to make an interpretation answerable to something beyond its own plausibility.

If two explanations fit what I have observed, what would help me distinguish them? If a relationship appears in the data, what else could produce it? What would I need to change, hold constant or observe differently before I could rely on the conclusion?

These are the questions that first drew me to psychology, asked of a different kind of evidence. I am still responsible for what I infer.

That is why the name feels larger to me the more I learn about it. It holds my attraction to insight alongside an obligation I want to bring to insight: the willingness to discover that a compelling reading was incomplete.

When ChatGPT offered me the line, “Firasa without measurement can become projection. Measurement without firasa can become counting,” it caught something I had been trying to connect.

The first half asks me to discipline interpretation. The second asks me to remember why I wanted to interpret anything in the first place. A perfectly recorded count can leave the important question untouched. A sensitive reading can outrun the evidence that would justify it. I want to work in the difficult relationship between those possibilities.

I do not hear the name as a declaration that I possess unusual access to the truth. I hear an aspiration I can fail to meet, and therefore a reason to keep practising.

There is affection in that. I have fallen increasingly in love with the word, with the range of attention it invites, and with the person I might become by taking that invitation seriously. I want it to be visible in how I work and in how I meet people, including when no research project is involved.

The next time a behaviour seems to explain itself, I want enough patience to ask what I have actually seen.

And enough room left in the reading for the person to answer.


This essay was composed in collaboration with AI from Kareem Soliman's account of his attraction to psychology and the meaning firāsa has acquired for him. The personal material is his; the AI helped develop the structure, examine the interpretation and check its historical boundaries. Kareem retains responsibility for the account and the final decision to publish it.

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